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Today's industrial landscape is characterized by rapid change and systemic technologies. Rapid 
change results in ever shorter product life cycles that demand continual innovation from firms. 
The systemic nature of technologies makes it dificuult, if not impossible, for any one firm to 
manufacture all components of a technological system. We propose that these challenges be 
met by designing technological systems that have the potential to yield economies of substitution. 
Additionally, we propose that rhese economies be realized by adopting the network mode of 
governance. We examine the network mode at three levels-intrafirm, interfirm, and 
institutional-to illuminate the inherent tension between cooperation and competition at each 
level, and to explore the implications of this tension for industrial dynamics. 
The Schumpeterian era during which 'gales of 
creative destruction' brought about revolutionary 
changes over long periods of time (Schumpeter, 
1942)- is past. In recent times, we have entered 
a neo-Schumpeterian era where technological 
change appears to be ceaseless. To survive in 
this new era, firms have to innovate continually 
(Klein, 1977). Continual innovation, however, 
imposes limits on a firm's ability to realize scale 
economies. Moreover, rapid change dampens the 
diffusion of new technologies as customers 
postpone purchases due to fear of obsolescence 
(Rosenberg, 1982). Slower diffusion of techno- 
logical changes creates problems for firms 
attempting to recoup investments made in 
technologies that change continually. 
There is another facet to this new era that 
renders contemporary environments different 
from those prevalent during Schumpeter's time. 
Specifically, many of these technologies are 
'systemic' in nature (Winter, 1987); i.e., they 
are embodied in multicomponent products that 
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connect to each other. The development and 
production of such technological systems require 
significant investments in several complementary 
technologies (Hakansson, 1989; Powell and 
Brantley, 1992; Quinn, 1992; Teece, 1987). It is 
difficult for any one firm to invest in all 
complementary technologies because. after a 
point, bottlenecks arise in the form of overex- 
tended scientists, engineers, and manufacturing 
personnel (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980). Such 
congestion imposes limits on the firm's ability to 
realize scope economies. 
How may firms deal with these challenges? 
We propose that firms take advantage of a 
different source of economies-economies of 
substitution-instead of relying exclusively on 
economies of scale and scope. We use the 
term 'substitution' to suggest that technological 
progress may be achieved by substituting certain 
components of a technological system while 
reusing others. The potential for such economies 
increases if technological systems are moduIarly 
upgradable. By designing modularly upgradable 
systems, firms can reduce product development 
time, leverage their past investments, and provide 
customers with continuity. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-97-32 
I?. Garud and A. Kurnaraswamy 
Additionally, we suggest that firms reorganize 
their internal and external relationships to reduce 
the costs of component reuse, while enhancing 
associated benefits. The nemork mode of govern- 
ance, with its emphasis on knowledge sharing, 
adaptability, and continual innovation, appears to 
be best suited for this task (Powell, 1990). 
Indeed, networks form the basis for a variety 
of arrangements ranging from giant Japanese 
'keiretsus' to small Italian firms linked by cooperat- 
ive associations (see Best, 1990; Kenney and 
Florida, 1993; Nelson and Wright, 1992; Piore 
and Sabel, 1984; Porter, 1990; Quinn, 1992). 
Increasingly, these network forms are challenging 
traditional 'Fordist' organizations based on Taylor's 
scientific mantigement principles. 
Figure 1 summarizes our core thesis and depicts 
the organization of this paper. First, we discuss 
how technological systems are built of compo- 
nents that interact with one another under an 
overall system architecture. We identify three 
system-level attributes: integrity, modularity, and 
upgradability. All three attributes must be con- 
sidered while designing technological systems for 
economies of substitution. We substantiate why 
technological systems must be modularly upgrad- 
able to yield economies of substitution. Then, 
we explore organizational issues that arise in 
realizing these economies of substitution. We 
emphasize the similarity between the design of 
technological systems and organizational systems 
for realizing substitution economies. Just as 
technological systems are composed of compo- 
nents interacting with one another within an 
overall architecture, these organizational systems 
are composed of individual firms interacting 
with each other within an overall institutional 
framework. We explore how modularly upgrad- 
able organizational systems may be created, and 
how modular upgradability gives rise to both 
cooperative and competitive dynamics. Finally, 
we discuss the implications of our thesis for firms 
operating in the neo-Schumpeterian era. 
components, but also on the extent to which 
they are compatible with one another (Gabel, 
1987; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and 
Rosenkopf, 1992). Compatibility is a relational 
attribute that defines rules of fit and interaction 
between components across boundaries called 
interfaces. The overall set of rules that defines 
acceptable fit and interactions constitutes a 
system's architecture. 
The degree of compatibility among components 
defines three important attributes of technological 
systems: integrity, modularity, and upgradability. 
Integrity represents 'the consistency between a 
product's function and its structure: the parts fit 
smoothly, components match and work well 
together, the layout maximizes available space' 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1990: 108). Although 
individual system components may have been 
designed to yield high performance, a lack of 
compatibility among them results in suboptimal 
system performance. In other words, incompati- 
bility between components comprises the integnty 
of a technological system. 
Firms may ensure system integrity by custom- 
designing components and assembling them 
through an iterative process of rework to obtain 
requisite fit and interaction, as in craft production 
(Cox, 1986; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990). 
Firms may also ensure system integrity by 
designing and producing components to standard 
dimensional and interface specifications. Con- 
formance to standard specifications enables the 
production of identical (and therefore 
interchangeable) components in large numbers, 
as in mass production (Marshall, 1961). 
Production of components conforming to stan- 
dard interface specifications also leads to modu- 
larity. Modularity allows components to be 
produced separately and used interchangeably in 
different configurations without compromising 
system integrity (Demsetz, 1993; Flamm, 1988; 
Garud and Kotha, 1994).' The degree of modu- 
larity of a technological system varies, depending 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS FOR ' Baldw~n and Clark (1994) make a useful distinction 
ECONOMIES OF SUBSTITUTION among rnodulurrty-m-destgn, rnodulurrty-~n-productzon, and 
rnodulunty-ln-me In t h ~ s  paper, we make a general argument 
that encompasses all three types of modulanty. Specifically, 
A technological system comprises a set of modulanty-ln-des~gn creates a potentla1 for the reuse of 
components that, together, provide utility to components and knowledge, modularity-in-production arises 
from the partitioning of production tasks, and modularity- 
'ystem performance is in-use provides customers the benefits of speed and scope 
not only on the performance of individual flexibility. 
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Figure 1. Technological and organizational designs for economies of substitution 
on whether interfaces are standardized within 
only a single firm or throughout an industry. In 
the former case, components may be used 
interchangeably only within a firm's own product 
lines. In the latter case, components manufac- 
tured by different firms may be mixed and 
matched. This ability to mix and match allows 
firms to offer a variety of system configurations, 
and to economize on product development 
investments (Baldwin and Clark, 1994; Pine, 
1993; Sanchez, this issue). At the same time, it 
offers customers the flexibility to buy components 
from different firms and create technological 
systems that are most appropriate for their 
requirements (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988). 
In rapidly changing environments, a third 
system-level attribute-upgradability, or the ease 
with which system performance can be enhanced 
over time-also becomes important. If a system 
is not upgradable, performance improvements 
may involve its complete redesign. Such a process 
entails the destruction of existing knowledge and 
competence. Given the rapidity of technological 
change, the repetitive destruction and creation 
of knowledge and competencies for each new 
generation may increase firms' R&D investments 
to levels that cannot be recouped within ensuing 
short product life cycles. At the same time, 
customers will be wary of adopting new technol- 
ogies that become obsolete rapidly, thereby 
decreasing the rate at which these technologies 
diffuse (Rosenberg, 1982). 
To be upgradable, a technological system 
must possess degrees of freedom that enable 
improvements in existing capabilities and the 
addition of new capabilitie~.~ To understand how 
The design of cochlear implants provides an illustration of 
all three system-level attributes. Cochlear implants are 
degrees of freedom may be created, we have 
to appreciate the hierarchical organization of 
components within a technological system (Clark, 
1985; Hughes, 1987; Simon, 1962). Component 
choices at any given level of the hierarchy 
outline operational boundaries for lower-order 
components. For instance, the performance capa- 
bility of a computer is dependent on the speed 
of its microprocessor. Over time, technological 
advances in microprocessor design have led to 
significant increases in the speed of the entire 
computer. These innovations in microprocessor 
design represent a movement 'up the system 
hierarchy' and, typically, represent revolutionary 
changes where system foundations are built 
biomedical devices that provide the profoundly deaf with a 
sensation of sound. For illustrative purposes, consider two 
parts of the implant: the electrode that is implanted within 
the cochlea, and the processor that is worn outside the body. 
Here, system integrity represents how well the processor 
works with the electrodes to create a sensation of sound. 
Modularity refers to the decoupling of the electrode from 
the processor. Recipients may disconnect the processor when 
desired, even though they are compelled to wear the electrode 
in the cochlea. Moreover, modularity provides the recipient 
with the flexibility to use different types of processors. The 
type of electrode implanted (single-channel or multichannel), 
however, limits the benefits that a recipient may derive from 
processor improvements. It is here that the notion of 
upgradability is best illustrated. A multichannel electrode 
possesses greater technological degrees of freedom. There- 
fore, it allows recipients to benefit from the development of 
new processing schemes that utilize more than one channel 
in the implanted electrode. In contrast, a single-channel 
electrode has fewer degrees of freedom, thereby limiting its 
upgradability (see Garud and Rappa, 1994, for more details). 
Moreover, in attempting to migrate from a single-channel 
device to a multichannel device, designers have not been 
able to retain either the electrode or the processing scheme 
associated with the single-channel device. This is because it 
is difficult to create a multichannel device by replacing only 
one or the other subsystem of the single-channel device. 
Both subsystems need to be replaced, thereby entailing a 
complete redesign of the device. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-97-32 
R. Garud and A. Kumaraswamy 
afresh (Clark, 1985): Movement up the system 
hierarchy makes it more difficult to maintain 
compatibility between product generations 
because core components are replaced. 
Firms, however, may design higher-order 
components with performance capabilities that 
are not fully exploited at early design stages. 
These unutilized degrees of freedom in higher- 
order components can be exploited progressively 
through innovations in lower-order components. 
Clark (1985) labels such innovations as a move- 
ment 'down the system hierarchy.' Specifically, 
movement down the hierarchy represents 
incremental change where core components are 
preserved even as innovations occur in lower- 
order components. In this case, it is easier to 
maintain compatibility between product gener- 
ations because innovations occur only in lower- 
order components. 
In sum, firms may impart upgradability to 
technological systems by designing unutilized 
degrees of freedom into higher-order compo- 
nents. These unutilized degrees of freedom 
enable designers to enhance system performance 
by substituting only those lower-order compo- 
nents whose potentials have been exhausted. 
However, the benefits of upgradability and 
associated retention of components must be 
weighed against the costs of component reuse. 
We now explore these benefits and costs in greater 
detail, and suggest how to design technological 
systems that yield economies of substitution. 
Economies of substitution 
Economies of substitution exist when the cost of 
designing a higher-performance system through 
the partial retention of existing components is 
lower than the cost of designing the system afresh 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). Component 
retention yields several benefits. The most 
obvious benefit is the reutilization of the existing 
base of knowledge associated with the retained 
components. Other benefits include savings in 
testing and production costs. Savings in testing 
costs arise when test programs developed for 
retained components are reused. This benefit is 
especially valuable in cases where test program 
development takes as much time as the actual 
design of the system itself. For instance, Texas 
Instruments (TI) cites such savings in testing 
costs as one of the main benefits that it expects 
to receive from its new PRISM methodology. 
TI'S PRISM methodology allows cirmit modules 
to be combined in different configurations to 
create new chips (Texas Insnuments, September 
1992). Additionally, the reuse of circuit modules 
enables TI to standardize chip fabrication proc- 
esses, thereby yielding significant savings in 
production costs. In general, savings in production 
costs accrue from the reutilization of capital 
equipment and production routines associated 
with reused components. 
Yet, these benefits have to be balanced against 
performance slippage and several costs incurred 
in reusing components. Performance slippage 
may occur when designers try to incorporate 
newly developed components into a technological 
system. This is because newly developed compo- 
nents may not fit or interact well with existing 
components, thereby compromising system integ- 
rity. 
Designers can minimize performance slippage 
by using gateway technologies, such as adapters 
and converters, that enable the coexistence of 
incompatible components within a technological 
system (David and Bunn, 1990). Gateway 
technologes, however, imply higher costs because 
they involve the development and usage of 
additional components. Moreover, gateway tech- 
nologies seldom restore system integrity com- 
pletely. Therefore, they may not provide the 
best way for firms to realize economies of 
sub~titution.~ 
A better way for firms to realize economies 
of substitution is by designing modularity into 
technological systems. Modularity minimizes per- 
formance slippage arising from incompatibility 
between the newly designed and reused compo- 
nents. Additionally, modularity makes it easier 
for designers to integrate newly developed 
components into the existing system; that is, 
modularity reduces incorporation costs for both 
designers and customers. Incorporation costs in 
a modular system are limited to eliminating 
incompatibilities that were not anticipated while 
desigrling standard interfaces. 
Therefore, modularity and upgradability are 
However, for systems that were originally designed for 
obsoiescence, gateway technologies remain the only way to 
retain or  reuse existing components. See Toffler (1971) for 
reasons why systems were designed for obsolescence in 
earlier periods. 
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both important system attributes for realizing 
economies of substitution. Modularity increases 
the ease with which system designers can substi- 
tute certain system components while retaining 
all others. Upgradability provides designers with 
the opportunity to work on an already-established 
technolo~cal platform thereby preserving their 
core knowledge base (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992). In this manner, modular upgradability 
simplifies the task of coping with very short life 
cycles. 
Besides enabling the preservation of knowledge 
over successive generations, modular upgrad- 
ability creates new knowledge that enhances, 
rather than destroys, existing knowledge. This 
competency-enhancing knowledge (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) is derived from experience as 
designers gain a deeper appreciation of (1) which 
aspects of the platform will lead to future 
improvements, (2) which aspects of the platform 
will lead to dead ends, and (3 )  how new lower- 
order components fit in with the base platform. 
Modular upgradability leads to economies of 
substitution in another way. Modular upgrad- 
ability allows firms to listen to customer feedback 
and modify their systems accordingly by substitut- 
ing some components while retaining the others. 
Rosenberg (1982) points out that such learning 
by using is essential for the evolution of complex 
multicomponent systems whose optimization only 
occurs through large-scale customer triaIs. Insofar 
as the system design incorporates modular 
upgradability, designers will find it easy and 
economical to carry out modifications. Wheel- 
wright and Clark (1992) call this process 'rapid 
prototyping. ' 
Increasingly, firms competing in neo- 
Schumpetarian environments are designing modu- 
larly upgradable systems to enable component 
reuse. In computer hardware, for instance, 
Sun Microsystems had created the modularly 
upgradable SparcstationlO family of computer 
workstations (see Garud and Kumaraswarny, 
Inc. reduced development costs by 30 percent 
through reuse of objects (Business Week, 30 
September 1991); and the U.S. Marine Corps 
reduced prototype time from the normal 6 to 8 
weeks to just 2 weeks. In general, OOP users 
report two- to five-fold increases in programmer 
productivity (Financial Executive, July/August 
1991)." 
Firms in the automobiIe industry, too, have 
designed models that allow for the sharing and 
reuse of key components. For instance, Honda 
developed a single basic 1994 Accord model and 
customized it later for different markets. Honda 
held its total development costs down by reusing 
components from other models. All versions of 
the 1994 Accord had at least 50 percent common 
components (Business Week, 21 December 1992). 
Additionally, Honda reduced retooling and pro- 
curement costs by (1) reusing components, 
(2) designing new components so that these could 
be manufactured using existing equipment in its 
Japanese and U.S. plants, and (3) delegating 
design of certain components entirely to its 
suppliers (Wall Street Journal, 1 September 1993). 
However, modularly upgradable technological 
designs alone are inadequate for firms to realize 
economies of substitution. This is because several 
costs are implicit in the design of modularly 
upgradable systems: initial design costs, testing 
costs, and search costs. Initial design costs refer 
to the additional costs that designers incur in 
creating components for reuse over and above 
those incurred in designing components for one- 
time use. These additional costs are incurred up- 
front to impart additional degrees of freedom to 
a system, such as standardized interfaces or the 
design of higher-order components with unutilized 
capabilities. For instance, analysts of OOP 
estimate that initial design costs of reusable 
objects may be as high as three to ten times the 
costs incurred in building an object for one-time 
use (Balda and Gustafson, 1990; Kain, 1994). 
1993, for more details). In computer software 
" Several researchers have studied and catalogued the actual 
develo~mentf programming costs and benefits of employing OOP techniques. Based 
(OOP), a technique that allows reuse of program on these studies, several simulation models that perform 
modules and easy upgradability, has gained in cost-benefit analysis for OOP and predict productivity 
increases and returns on investment have been generated 
popularity and usage firms. using OoP (e.g., Banker, Kaufman, and Zweig, 1993; Gaffney and 
techniques, Brooklyn Union Gas Company cre- Durek, 1989; Graham, 1994, 1995; Henderson-Sellers, 1993; 
ated 20 percent more functionality (over the Pfleeger, 1991). As data on the costs and benefits of 
employing OOP have accumulated, these simulations are 
previous nOnObject-Oriented with 40 yielding more accurate estimations of productivity and return 
percent fewer lines of code; Shearson Lehrnan, bn investment. 
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Baldwin and Clark (1994) highlight that testing 
costs constitute a high proportion of product 
innovation costs. They suggest that the ability to 
perform tests at the component level (rather than 
at the system level) is essential for reducing testing 
costs. Although testing at the component level and 
the reuse of testing programs reduce costs, overall 
testing costs increase cumulatively with the number 
of modular components to be tested. Additionally, 
as Baldwin and Clark point out, designers of 
different components must strike prior agreements 
on the interface specifications and the encompassing 
system architecture to develop testing programs. 
This increases initial design costs. 
Finally, designers incur search costs to locate 
reusable components. Typically, search costs 
increase with the proliferation of modular, reusable 
components. For instance, in OOP, Banker et al. 
(1993) found that reuse percentage decreased with 
an increase in the number of reuse candidates. 
They cite the case of Carter Hawley Hale 
Information Services where reuse dropped by more 
than 15 percent when the number of reusable 
objects in the firm's repository grew by four times. 
In these cases, even libraries that allowed searches 
by key words did not promote reuse. 
To realize economies of substitution, then, 
initial design costs and testing costs need to be 
amortized over a number of reuses, and search 
costs need to be minimized. These demands raise 
issues concerning the design of appropriate 
organizational systems. For instance, consider 
a firm that does not consciously encourage 
component reuse. In such a firm, the extra 
costs associated with the creation of modularly 
upgradable components may not be amortized 
fully. Consequently, the firm will not realize 
economies of substitution. Or consider a firm 
that does not institute effective mechanisms to 
search for reusable components. In such a firm, 
high search costs may prevent reuse altogether; 
or even if reuse occurs, costs may outweigh 
benefits. Again, the firm will not realize econo- 
mies of substitution. 
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR 
ECONOMIES OF SUBSTITUTION 
Technological systems consist of components that 
together provide utility to users. Similarly, 
firms that manufacture the components of a 
technologicai system together comprise an organi- 
zational system for that technology. Relationships 
between these firms are analogous to interactions 
between components of the technological system. 
The mosaic of rules, procedures, and norms that 
comprise the institutional environment of this 
organizational system parallels the architecture 
of a technological system. 
A key challenge in realizing economies of 
substitution is the design of organizational systems 
that enhance component retention or reuse while 
reducing associated costs. We suggest that this 
challenge be met by designing organizational 
systems to be 'modularly upgradable.' A modu- 
Iariy upgradable organizational system allows 
constituent members to work independently and 
in unison, even as they evolve over time.5 
Intrafirm issues 
Realization of economies of substitution requires 
knowledge sharing and the reuse of components. 
Traditional hierarchical and SBU structures, 
however, inhibit realization of these economies. 
Specifically, these traditional structures result in 
'knowledge hoarding' by independently func- 
tioning units. To encourage 'knowledge sharing,' 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) propose that firms 
organize themselves around core competencies. 
Garud and Nayyar (1994) recommend that 
firms enhance knowledge sharing and reuse by 
cataloguing, updating, and distributing lists of 
available 'shelved projects' (see also Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Kotha (this issue) reports how 
the National Bicycle Company rotates personnel 
between its plants, thereby creating a mechanism 
for the sharing of tacit knowledge (see also 
Nonaka, 1994). Indeed, Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson 
(1992) report that related-diversified firms that 
install mechanisms to promote cooperation and 
knowledge sharing between constituent units tend 
to perform well. 
Cusumano (1991) illustrates how a knowledge- 
sharing organization might look in his description 
of Toshiba's software production facilities. Tosh- 
Following Weick (1976) and Granovetter (1985), we must 
design various elements of an organizational system such 
that they are coupled neither too tightly nor too loosely. 
Very tight coupling between elements will constrain the 
evolution of the system. Very loose coupling. on the other 
hand, will undermine the coordination required for system 
elements to function in an integrated manner. 
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iba has instituted elaborate procedures to evalu- 
ate, catalogue, store, and disseminate reusable 
software throughout the company, thereby reduc- 
ing search costs. Toshiba has also created special 
'committees,' 'departments,' and 'centers' to 
ensure that designers create reusable software 
and reduce incorporation costs by conforming to 
company-wide standards. Additionally, commit- 
tees help overcome the short-term concerns that 
may arise with knowledge sharing and reuse. 
There are yet other challenges involved in 
designing reusabie components, and in reusing 
components designed by others. As Mary Wells, 
erstwhile training program manager at Tektronix 
Inc., asserted: 'There will always be tension 
between those pushing for a library and reuse, 
and those trying to get a job done. People 
focusing on reuse want to make (objects) 
as general as possible, while the application 
developers want things as specific as possible' 
(Datamation, 15 November 1989: 90). In a similar 
vein, Graham (1994) states: 'We are used to 
rewarding analysts and programmers according 
to the amount of code they produce rather than 
the amount of other people's code they reuse 
. . . . Furthermore, project managers are paid 
to make projects come in on time and not to 
write code for the benefit of subsequent projects7 
(also see Banker et al., 1993; Cusumano 1991). 
Therefore, firms need to realign their incentives 
to encourage reuse. 
Cusumano (1991) describes Toshiba's inte- 
grated set of incentives and controls associated 
with knowledge sharing and reuse. At the 
beginning of each project, managers at Toshiba 
agree to productivity targets that can be met only 
if a certain percentage of software specifications, 
designs, or code is reused. Design review meetings 
held at the end of each phase in the development 
cycle monitor progress against reuse targets. 
Moreover, when building new software, manage- 
ment requires project members to register a 
certain number of components in data bases for 
reuse in later projects. Personnel receive awards 
for registering particularly valuable or frequently 
reused modules, and their formal evaluations 
from superiors report on whether they have 
met their reuse targets. An overall committee, 
meanwhile, monitors reuse levels at Toshiba as 
well as deviations from targets both at the project 
and individual levels, and provides regular reports 
to managers. 
Although reuse and knowledge sharing lead 
to economies of substitution, they have the 
potential to trap firms within the confines of old 
knowledge. To overcome this eventuality, Garud 
and Nayyar (1994) suggest that firms must 
continually create new knowledge through a 
combination of the old. (See also Jelinek and 
Schoonhoven, 1990.) Moreover, Hamel and 
Prahalad (1994) note that firms must upgrade 
their core competencies over time, partially by 
continually retraining employees. Lei, Hitt, and 
Bettis (1995) provide a more complete thesis on 
how firms can update core competencies through a 
meta-learning process that consists of information 
transfer, continuous improvement based on 
experimentation, and the development of firm- 
specific skills based on dynamic routines 
These arguments, and the Toshiba example 
in particular, establish a firm's capabilities to 
reorganize its structure, routines, and incentives 
to encourage reuse and realize economies of 
substitution. However, there are limits to the 
number of activities any one firm can perform 
within the purview of its administrative structure. 
To appreciate these limits, we have to compare 
the costs of internalizing activities within the 
firm with the costs of sharing some of these 
activities with other firms. 
Internalizing activities within a firm involves 
two costs: managerial and production costs. 
Managerial costs increase with the number of 
components produced in-house (lateral 
integration) and with the number of stages 
required to produce a given component (vertical 
integration). First, as the extent of vertical and 
lateral integration increases, managerial costs of 
coordinating different activities increases dispro- 
portionately (Demsetz, 1993; Piore, 1992). These 
coordination costs will increase further if conges- 
tion occurs in the deployment of scarce resources 
among competing activities (Teece, 1980). 
Second, cognitive complexity faced by managers 
also increases. This is particularly true in neo- 
Schumpeterian environments where each change 
brings with it disproportionate cognitive demands. 
As cognitive complexity increases, at some point, 
it becomes more costly for a firm to undertake 
any more activities in-house than it is to delegate 
them to other firms. 
Additionally, in-house production costs will 
increase if the demand experienced by a firm is 
low or uncertain. In such circumstances, the firm 
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cannot justify production facilities that operate 
at a minimum efficient scale for each ~omponen t .~  
However, a specialized firm that consolidates 
demand for a particular component can justify 
building a minimum efficient scale plant, thereby 
realizing scale economies.' 
Thus, in neo-Schumpeterian environments, 
increases in managerial and production costs are 
key forces for the disaggregation of activities. To 
understand fully why disaggregation is occurring, 
however, we must trade off the benefits of 
depending upon external component manufac- 
turers with increases in transactions costs 
(Langlois and Robertson, 1992). Transactions 
costs arise from asset specificity under uncer- 
tainty, and from the potential for opportunistic 
behavior under conditions of information asym- 
metry and bounded rationality (Williamson, 
1985). However, the advent of information 
technologies (such as electronic data interchange) 
allows firms to coordinate activities more closely 
(Manzi, 1994), thereby reducing information 
asymmetry and opportunism. Furthermore, a 
steady movement in many systemic industries 
toward industry-wide standards has reduced 
asset specificity and small numbers bargaining. 
Consequently, transactions costs are progressively 
decreasing (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987; 
Quinn, 1992). With decreases in transactions 
costs and increases in managerial and production 
costs, firms are focusing on a set of conceptually 
related activities and outsourcing the rest 
(Demsetz, 1993; Langlois, 1992; Piore, 1992; 
Piore and Sabel, 1984; Richardson, 1972).8 
Interfirm issues 
As firms manufacture only some components 
and outsource others, they implicitly 'partition' 
the technological ~ y s t e m . ~  Partitioning a techno- 
A firm could establish minimum efficient scale plants and 
sell excess production to other system manufacturers. But, 
as the number of system components manufactured in-house 
increases, the firm will encounter greater cognitive complexity 
and higher coordination costs in dealing with multiple 
activities in several different markets. 
' Even with the usage of flexible manufacturing technologies, 
eventually cognitive complexity will set in as the variety of 
product configurations increases. 
For several illustrations, see a recent Forrune (14 December 
1994) article which provides the benefits of outsourcing and 
examples of firms that benefited from outsourcing. 
von Hippel (1994) offers the notion of sticky data to explain 
why such a task partitioning is important. Data are sticky 
logical system can create an organizational system 
whose organizational modules (firms) can engage 
and disengage in response to market and techno- 
logical changes (also see Miles and Snow, 1986; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1994). However, to 
accomplish such 'flexible specialization' (Piore 
and Sable, 1984), it is important that these 
organizational modules coordinate among them- 
selves to design and produce compatible compo- 
nents. Otherwise, performance slippage and the 
costs associated with integrating the various 
components into a technological system will 
become prohibitively high. 
A key question is whether such integration 
should be left to markets, or whether some other 
governance mode is required. If we were dealing 
with a static technological system, perhaps 
markets could serve as a forum for integration. 
However, when technological systems are chang- 
ing rapidly, the cost of creating and maintaining 
interface standards within a market mode of 
governance will be prohibitively high. Standardi- 
zation requires much closer coordination among 
firms than markets can offer. 
Coordination between vertically interde- 
pendent firms requires an approach to contracting 
that emphasizes long-term relationships based on 
trust and reputation (Macneil, 1980; Powell, 
1990). lo Analogous to the notion of unutilized 
degrees of freedom in technological systems, 
relationships between firms are defined broadly, 
allowing enough latitude for evolution over time. 
Once relationships are established, continual 
interactions (including the exchange of strategic 
information, personnel and knowledge) among 
collaborating firms create an environment that 
when there are costs associated with replicating and diffusing 
location-specific information. Consequently, if different 
components of a technological system require conceptually 
different kinds of knowledge, it makes sense to partition the 
system into modules that different members can manufacture 
in a distributed manner. 
'O Relational contracting is an important characteristic of the 
Japanese Keiretsu system (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Aoki, 
1990; Piore and Sable, 1984; Womack et al., 1990). Keiretsus 
are characterized by a go.remance mode that possesses 
features of both markets and vertically integrated hierarchies 
while being neither. Reflecting on the benefits of such a 
'quasi-integrated' system, Aoki (1990: 3) states: 'A key to 
an understanding of Japan's industrial performance can be 
found in the ability of firms in certain industries to coordinate 
their operating activities flexibly and quickly in response to 
changing market conditions and to changes in other factors 
in the industrial environment, as well as to emergent technical 
and technological exigencies'. 
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engenders trust and mutual accommodation. That destiny will be joined with that of the other. 
is, the relationships between firms become And mutual dependence will characterize the 
'upgradable.' Indeed, as Morgan (1986) points relationships' (Davidow and Malone, 1993: 142). 
out, the broadest agreement would be one in The advent of new information-mediated tech- 
which only those eventualities that definitely nologies (Zuboff, 1984) makes coordination 
must be avoided (noxiants) are specified. between firms all the more possible (Fombrun 
The classical approach to contingent claims and Astley, 1982). If we view firms as modules 
contracting reduces such upgradability. This is of knowledge, mechanisms such as electronic 
because contingent claims contracts create a rigid data interchange (Malone et af., 1987) enable 
framework for relationships by attempting to connections between these modules and promote 
prespecify performance under all likely contin- interfirm coordination. These information 
gencies (Macneil, 1980). However, when tech- technologies reduce transactions costs, thereby 
nology is evolving rapidly and it is difficult to improving the management of disaggregated 
foresee the future, the very notion of a contingent systems (Quinn, 1992). 
claims contract becomes questionable. " A neo-Schumpeterian industrial landscape 
Furthermore, a zero-sum mentality which requires cooperation between horizontally inter- 
prescribes that firms should view buyer-supplier dependent firms as well. As technologies change, 
relationships as a source of competition also firms may find that they do not have all 
inhibits upgradability (Garud, 1994). For the required competencies to create a viable 
instance, Porter (1980) has suggested that firms technological system. These competencies may 
should develop 'bargaining advantage' over sup- be resident in their rivals. Given the difficult 
pliers to 'squeeze out the best deal.' Such a zero- task of creating new competencies rapidly as and 
sum mentality engenders distrust (Kelley and when they are required, firms may be compelled 
Stahelski, 1970; Weick, 1979) and leads to to forge hybrid arrangements with rivals.13 
conflict in a self-fulfilling way. Eventually, such Taligent is one such hybrid arrangement. IBM 
a mentality destroys the coordination required and Apple, two direct competitors, created the 
to realize economies of substitution. Taligent collaborative venture and gave it wide 
There are indications that some firms in latitude to create a common object-oriented 
the U.S.A. are increasing their emphasis on operating system. 
upgradable relational contracts. For instance, Another form of cooperation between horizon- 
vertically related firms are focusing on the tally interdependent firms is knowledge sharing 
practical aspects of building relationships and without the formation of a formal alliance such 
trust among themselves. In particular, some firms as a joint venture (Langlois and Robertson, 
are reducing the number of suppliers and focusing 1992). Knowledge sharing between rivals is 
their energies on building long-term relationships desirable to the extent that it increases the 
with this core group.12 Such long-term relation- density of firms manufacturing technological 
ships seek to ensure that ' . . [elach player's systems that conform to a common standard. As 
the density of firms manufacturing systems to a 
common standard increases, so do the benefits 
This line of reasoning has led many researchers to suggest 
that these types of transactions be internalized within firms. 
However, as we have noted earlier, there are limits to the 
different kinds and number of activities that can be 
internalized. 
" A recent Fortune (21 February 1994) article describes 
these emerging practices in the U.S.A. For instance, AMP, 
a manufacturer of electronic connectors, supplied Silicon 
Graphics, a workstations manufacturer, with an order over 
the weekend to replace defective connectors (supplied by a 
competitor) on the basis of just a phone call. Similarly, 
Donnelley Corporation built a new plant to manufacture 
exterior mirrors for Honda based on a verbal agreement to 
initiate a new partnership. From Honda's point of view too, 
this agreement involved a lot of trust because Donnelley 
neither had prior experience in making exterior mirrors nor 
did it have the requisite production facilities. 
to customers who get a wider choice of com- 
plementary products from which to create their 
preferred system configurations (see Wade, 
1994). The larger customer base, in turn, provides 
'' In dynamic environments, in-house development of compo- 
nents as and when they are required is prohibitively expensive 
because of time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989). Time compression diseconomies arise when an 
attempt is made to reduce the time taken to accomplish a 
set of activities by allocating additional resources. The 
diseconomies result because the resources additionally 
required are disproportionately more than the benefits that 
accrue from time compression. 
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incentives to manufacturers of complementary 
components to invest in innovation. 
In their study of the music and computer 
industries, for instance, Langlois and Robertson 
(1992) note that a firm can earn higher profits 
by sharing knowledge with rivals than by 
attempting to appropriate all the benefits itself. 
They add that 'when a component maker is 
unable to offer customers enough variety to 
justify the purchase of associated components in 
a modular system, the most successful firms will 
be those that abandon a proprietary strategy in 
favor of membership in a network of competitors 
employing a common standard of compatibility' 
(Langlois and Robertson, 1992: 301). 
Eventually, distinctions between horizontal and 
vertical interdependence become blurred. As 
vertically interdependent firms learn from one 
another, they may become horizontally interde- 
pendent over time (Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 
1989). For instance, Donnelley Corporation, a 
supplier of glass for making mirrors, became a 
rival to its own buyers when it built a plant to 
supply Honda with exterior mirrors (Fortune, 21 
February 1994). As winners and losers arise in 
a technological race, firms that were horizontally 
interdependent may become vertically interde- 
pendent over time. For instance, Next Corpor- 
ation, an erstwhile rival to workstation manufac- 
turers like Hewlett Packard and Sun 
Microsystems, exited the workstation hardware 
market and currently supplies its object-oriented 
tools and operating system software to these 
companies. Moreover, two firms that are verti- 
cally interdependent in one organizational system 
may become horizontally interdependent in 
another organizational system. In the telecom- 
munications industry, for instance, AT&T sup- 
plies wireless communications equipment to the 
Baby Bells. However, with its recent acquisition 
of McCaw, AT&T will compete with the Baby 
Bells in the cellular services market. 
In summary, the partitioning of the technologi- 
cal system among specialized manufacturers 
confers modularity on the organizational system. 
The coordination of specialized firms manufactur- 
ing components of the partitioned technological 
system occurs under a governance mode that is 
neither a hierarchy nor a market (Best, 1990; 
Powell, 1990; Richardson, 1972). This governance 
mode is characterized by a 'lattice type' network 
of relationships (Powell and Brantley, 1992) 
wherein the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical relationships becomes blurred. TE.lis net- 
work structure must be generally, rather than 
specifically, defined to allow enough latitude for 
interfirm relationships within the organizational 
systems to evolve with time. The result is a 
modularly upgradable organizational system. 
Piore and Sabel(1984) note that the partitioning 
of tasks in the production process need not 
map neatly on to customers' preferred system 
configurations. In this regard, intermediary firms, 
commonly known as value-added resellers or 
system integrators, play an important role. Such 
firms perform two functions. First, they provide 
customized solutions to meet specific customer 
needs. In doing so, they reduce the cognitive 
complexity customers confront in mixing and 
matching the components manufactured by differ- 
ent firms. Second, when performance slippage 
occurs due to incompatibilities created by techno- 
logical change, these firms ensure that the 
integrity of the technological system is main- 
tained. To this extent, the role of system 
integrators in an organizational system is anal- 
ogous to the role of gateway technologies in a 
technological system.14 
Whereas system integrators reduce cognitive 
complexity, their presence increases transactions 
costs. These costs can be minimized to the 
extent that members of an organizational system 
subscribe to a common set of standards. Accord- 
ing to Astley and Brahm (1989: 258), for 'the 
functionai integration of modules as part of a 
coherent system, an overarching "framework" of 
planning and coordination would be necessary' 
(see also Toffler, 1985). Indeed, we are now 
witnessing a growing movement toward 'open 
standards' in the institutional environment of 
standards. Open standards act as mechanisms 
for coordinating the emerging network mode by 
reducing transaction costs. We now direct our 
attention to the institutional aspects of open 
standards creation. 
For instance. in OOP, several firms, including Visual Edge 
Software Ltd., Iona Technologies Inc., and Digital Equipment 
Corporation, have created products to bridge various systems 
based on incompatible object models from Object Manage- 
ment Group (OMG) and Microsoft Corporation 
(Computerworld, 3 October 1994, p. 8.). Recently, however, 
Microsoft and OMG have agreed to make their object 
models compatible with each other (Computerworld, 5 
September 1994, p. 1). 
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Institutional issues 
Langlois and Robertson (1992) distinguish 
between two types of networks: 'centralized' and 
'decentralized.' They suggest that a centralized 
network is one in which network members are 
tied to a 'lead' firm, as in the Japanese automobile 
industry. A decentralized network is one in 
which no one firm exercises exclusive control 
over common standards; moreover, any firm that 
tries to dictate standards in a decentralized 
network risks being isolated if network members 
and customers do not follow its lead. 
Increasingly, we are witnessing the growth of 
such decentralized networks in rapidly changng 
systemic environments, because of network exter- 
nalities (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1991). Network 
externalities arise when the benefits a user derives 
from a product increase from current levels as 
others use compatible products (e.g., Farrell and 
Saloner, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1985).15 In the 
presence of network externalities, the larger the 
network, the greater is its attraction. In such a 
situation, firms are finding it in their best interests 
to adhere to industry-wide standards and promote 
compatibility, thereby increasing network bene- 
fits.16 Even the largest of firms have been forced 
to participate in the joint setting of industry- 
wide standards. For instance, in the computer 
industry, dominant computer manufacturers 
(e.g., IBM in the U.S.A. and NEC in Japan) 
were reluctant to adopt open standards, fearing 
loss of market control. However, over time, 
customers have compelled even these firms to 
offer systems based on open standards.17 
The importance of compatibility in OOP is captured by 
Graham (1994: 5), who states: 'Object technology can only 
succeed against the inertia of existing practice if users can 
achieve the confidence in moving to it that they require from 
a move to open systems. If object-oriented applications are 
all mutually incompatible, if object-oriented databases cannot 
interwork with each other and with relational databases and 
if there are no standard notations and terms for object- 
oriented analysis there is little hope of this (success).' 
'" See Arthur (1988). David (1993), and Garud and Kumara- 
swamy (1993) for a deeper appreciation of why the presence 
of network externalities is leading to the creation of open 
standards in contemporary environments. 
" For instance, the Network Applications Consortium, a 
group of 25 large users with annual revenues of almost $200 
billion, hopes to use its buying capacity to exert pressure on 
hardware and software vendors to conform to standards, so 
that applications, operating systems, and network services 
from various vendors can work smoothly together 
(Computerworld, 12 September 1994). 
Although the impetus for open standards stems 
from market demands for compatibility, the 
actual process of standard-setting is political- 
one that unfolds in the institutional environment 
of standards-setting bodies. The political process 
manifests itself in the form of broad agreements 
on system architecture, rather than in the form 
of precise definitions of standards. Indeed, only 
such broad agreements provide organizational 
and technological systems with the degrees of 
freedom required for future evolution. Recogniz- 
ing the importance of this upgradability, Graham 
(1994) suggests that open standards must be 
specified at a high level of abstraction to allow 
greater degrees of freedom. At the same time, 
if standards are specified too loosely, they may 
result in the creation of incompatible components. 
Working with open standards leads to decentra- 
lized innovation wherein individual firms can 
autonomously create differentiated components. 
At an extreme, a proliferation of components 
occurs, thereby increasing the costs involved in 
identifying and selecting appropriate components 
(both for system manufacturers and users). Under 
these circumstances, specialized information bro- 
kers arise to reduce these search costs. For 
instance, in the case of OOP, the Object 
Management Group has created an information 
brokerage that provides information as well as a 
market for component software. Participating 
firms list their products with the brokerage, 
along with descriptive information and product 
specifications (Object Management Group, 25 
July 1994: 1). 
Thus, open standards reduce asset specificity 
and information asymmetry between interde- 
pendent firms manufacturing complementary 
components of a larger system. Moreover, with 
open standards, the negative consequences of 
opportunistic behavior are mitigated because no 
one firm can change industry-wide standards on 
its own. No firm is held hostage by others 
because open standards create second sources 
for the supply of components. Therefore, as 
more firms embrace open standards, transaction 
costs decline. In turn, a reduction in transactions 
costs makes it possible for firms to form dynamic 
networks (Miles and Snow, 1986). In these 
dynamic networks, coordination occurs through 
institutional mechanisms that comprise both the 
standard-setting bodies and the open standards 
they foster. While modularity in the organiza- 
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tional system makes it highly adaptive to external 
contingencies, the overarching institutional 
umbrella of standards maintains overall consist- 
ency of action. 
In sum, just as relational contracting imparts 
hierarchy-like characteristics to the network 
organizational system, the institutional environ- 
ment of open standards imparts market-like 
characteristics to it. Reliance on open standards 
allows firms to 'trade' knowledge encapsulated 
in reusable components. Just as markets comprise 
regulatory bodies and institutional arrangements 
to guarantee efficiency, the organizational system 
comprises autonomous bodies to maintain and 
guarantee conformance to open standards. In 
markets, changes in customer demand result in 
resource reallocation between competing activi- 
ties. In organizational systems too, customers 
play an important role in providing incentives 
for firms to conform to a common set of 
standards. Specifically, customers are the arbiters 
of whether or not a technological system has 
greater network benefits, and firms that offer 
'incompatible' systems pay a price. At the same 
time, institutionalized standards endow memory 
on the organizational system-a feature missing 
in traditional atomistic markets. Thus, open 
standards create a unique institutional environ- 
ment that coordinates activities of the organiza- 
tional system. 
COOPERATIVE AND COMPETITIVE 
DYNAMICS IN A MODULARLY 
UPGRADABLE WORLD 
We have introduced three levels of analysis- 
intrafirm, interfirm, and institutional-to explain 
how organizational systems may be designed to 
realize economies of substitution. A fundamental 
attribute of these emerging organizational systems 
is the presence of both cooperation and compe- 
tition at each of the three levels. Within the 
firm, for instance, competition for a limited 
pool of resources between individuals creates 
incentives for increasing current performance 
even at the expense of future performance. 
Contributions to current performance provide 
instant recognition and rewards, whereas contri- 
butions to future performance (through the 
design of reusable components) may yield little 
recognition or rewards. Moreover, creators of 
reusable components may have to face an 
additional burden when problems arise with their 
reusable components. Consequently, there will 
be a tendency to avoid or postpone the creation 
of reusable components. In addition, there may 
be a reluctance to reuse components designed 
by others (even if created). Clearly, cooperation 
is required to create and reuse such components. 
Firms need to balance the tension between 
cooperation and competition by instituting appro- 
priate systems, structures, and incentives to 
encourage the creation of resuable components. 
This tension between cooperation and compe- 
tition is manifest at the interfinn level as well. 
Firms confronting a rapidly changing techological 
system wdl have to rely on others for complemen- 
tary components even as they focus on the creation 
of core components. Indeed, firms will have to 
share knowledge with one another to ensure that 
the components they manufacture are compatible. 
Knowledge sharing, in turn, increases competitive 
pressures on firms.18 In such a situation, finns 
have to innovate continually, destroying some core 
competencies and enhacning others to suit current 
requirements (see Lei et al., 1995, for a detailed 
discussion of how core competencies can be 
changed over time). 
As Powell and Brantley (1992) and Mowery 
and Rosenberg (1989) suggest, these efforts to 
extend and adapt core competencies essentially 
serve as a 'ticket of admission' into the wider 
organizational network to which they belong. 
Indeed, from this perspective, the main question 
is not whether to 'make or buy.' Rather, it is 
'What competencies are complementary to our 
own?' so that access to these may be secured 
through appropriate realignment of relationships 
within organizational networks (Quinn, 1992; see 
also Black and Boal, 1994). Depending on how 
firms answer this question, they may terminate 
some relationships and forge new ones to create 
a dynamic learning environment that enables 
them to adapt to the demands of an evolving 
technological system. 
The tension between cooperation and compe- 
tition pervades the institutional level as well. 
lR For instance, Motorola, Apple, and IBM have had to 
share technical knowledge with one another in order to 
create the Power PC microprocessor; this effort eventually 
will increase competitive pressures on each firm to innovate 
(Fortune. 14 December 1994). 
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Because of network benefits, firms will try to 
create or join as large a netuork as possible. As 
we saw earlier, this implies the creation of, or 
conformance to, open standards. To this extent, 
cooperation is required. However, confronting 
the prospect of subscribing to common standards, 
firms would want to be proactive in shaping 
these standards to suit their competencies better. 
Specifically, each firm would want its own 
component specifications built directly into 
emerging standards. To this extent, firms compete 
to define standards that favor their own concep- 
tualization of the technological system. 
Thus, firms operating in a neo-Schumpeterian 
world of rapidly changing systemic technologies 
have to focus their attention on some core 
components while depending upon others for 
complementary ones. To ensure compatibility 
between these components, firms have to share 
their knowledge with others and subscribe to 
open standards. Such cooperation leads to compe- 
tition as firms differentiate their activities through 
innovation and attempt to shape their institutional 
environment of standards. In this way, the 
tension between cooperation and competition is 
manifest between levels of the organizational 
systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Kenney and Florida (1993) state that the 'chal- 
lenge facing American industry is similar to that 
faced by Britain at the turn of the century-the 
need to restructure according to the organiza- 
tional principles of a new production paradigm 
in the face of social inertia resulting from the 
legacy of a past industrial order.' These authors 
caution that American industry may lose its 
global leadership role if contemporary industrial 
challenges are not articulated in appropriate 
technological and organizational terms. 
This paper is an attempt to pose these 
challenges in appropriate technoIogical and 
organizational terms. Specifically, firms are 
~ r g a n i ~ a t i ~ n a l  systems for economies of 
tution is an ability to manage what we, 
considered to be mutually exclusive con 
incremental vs. radical technological , 
markets vs. hierarchies, cooperation vs. 
tition, and craft vs. mass production. A 
we can see a trend toward the coexistt 
these mutually exclusive concepts as evl 
by the prevalence of terms such as 'n 
upgradability' (New York Times, June 22 
'networks' (Powell, 1990), 'co-opetitior 
Sam Albert in Fortune, 14 December 19' 
'mass customization' (Pine, 1993). Clea 
need new theoretical frames to underst: 
basis for these concepts. 
Our paper provides a basis for unders 
how these new terms are the order of t 
industrial landscape. For instance, consi, 
dichotomy between radical and increment 
nological change. As our paper suggests, 
logical change need not be radical breaktk 
that destroy previous knowledge. l9 Inn 
from scratch each time is difficult, 
impossible, given the systemic nature of t 
ogies and the rapidity of change. At th 
time, reliance on incremental change mz 
technological progress and lead to stag 
Instead, firms may create higher-perf 
systems by reusing some components and 
tuting others, thereby building on existing 
edge and reaping economies of subst 
Thus, the technological change proces 
not be either incremental or radical, I: 
incorporate aspects of both. 
Similarly, consider the traditional dicl 
between markets and hierarchies. As o u ~  
suggests, the network mode of gove 
integrates both the decentralization of 
governance and the coordination of hien 
governance. Moreover, we argue that the n 
mode requires reconceptualization of 
practices at the intrafirm, interfirm, an1 
tutional levels. For instance, at the ir 
level, we need to design systems, incentiv 
operating in a neo-Schumpeterian environment 
where systemic technologies are changing rapidly. '" We are not alone in suggesting this. Usher (195 
the thesis of cumulative synthesis where inventio In such an environment, firms have design through accumu]ation of  incremental progress in S 
technological systems to yield economies of unconnected areas until such time the stage is set f 
substitution, and at the same time, design of insight (the actual invention) to take place. ' 
Dougherty (1992) suggests that product innovation 
organizational systems to exploit these economies. in a vacuum. but tvDicallv build upon ,. ,
Implicit in the design of technological and knowledge. 
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structures that promote knowledge sharing rather 
than knowledge hoarding. At the interfirm 
level, we need to conceptualize alliances and 
relationships in fluid terms calling into attention 
relational aspects of contracting. At  the insti- 
tutional level, we need to explore the sociopolit- 
ical processes involved in the creation and 
evolution of self-regulatory mechanisms such as 
open standards. Emphasizing the unique status 
of networks, Powell (1990: 299) declared that 
they are 'neither fish nor fowl, nor some mongrel 
hybrid, but a distinctly different form.' Indeed, 
Powell argues that network governance is the 
most appropriate mode for organizing complex 
and idiosyncratic exchanges (such as knowledge) 
under dynamic conditions. 
Next, consider the dichotomy between 
cooperation and competition. As our paper 
suggests, firms need to cooperate and compete 
with one another simultaneously. Firms need to 
cooperate with suppliers and even rivals to secure 
complementary resources, skills, or components. 
At the same time, they may have to compete 
with their collaborators in the product markets. 
For instance, standards creation requires 
cooperation among firms; at the same time, these 
firms compete with one another to ensure that 
their own technical specifications are included in 
the evolving standards. 
Together, the technological and organizational 
designs that we have described in this paper 
address another dichotomy-the trade-off between 
craft and mass production. Specifically, modular 
upgradability makes it possible for customers to 
mix and match components to create customized 
solutions to their technological needs. At the same 
time, modular upgradability allows firms to realize 
scale and scope economies. For instance, firms 
realize scale economies when they partition the 
system and specialize in mass producing specific 
components (an aspect that Baldwin and Clark, 
1994, term as modularity-in-production). Firms 
realize scope economies by reusing components 
across different product lines (GoIdhar and Jelinek, 
1983). Thus, modular upgradability leads to mass 
customization (Pine, 1993). 
Although our paper provides a framework 
with which to view these emerging phenomena, 
it is but a first step. As is the case with most 
new frameworks, ours raises as many questions 
for future research as it attempts to answer. For 
instance, what are the limits to economies of 
substitution? Clearly, after a pain; 
results in too many options, there 
cognitive complexity and search cos 
ers, manufacturers, and customers. 1 
too has its limits; the degrees of f 
into a system will be exhausted eve 
can firms anticipate these limits an$ 
to sustain continual innovation? 
Consider another issue. How can 
organizational systems that balanc 
demands created by the coe 
cooperation and competition? We 
description of a network form that is 
industries characterized by network 
and built around technological sys~ 
have reported network forms in indu: 
from biotechnology to textiles I 
Kenney and Florida, 1993; Nelson 
1992; Piore and Sabel, 1984; P 
Powell, 1990; Quinn, 1992). Wl 
idiosyncratic features of these net. 
These are but illustrative question: 
researchers and practitioners need 
Indeed, our ability to raise the 
questions and address them is cri 
continued success of American f 
emerging industrial order. 
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